How do teachers respond to tenure? by unknown
Jones IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:8 
DOI 10.1186/s40172-015-0024-6ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open AccessHow do teachers respond to tenure?
Michael D JonesCorrespondence: m.jones@uc.edu
Department of Economics,
University of Cincinnati, 324 Lindner
Hall, 2925 Campus Green Drive,
Cincinnati, OH 45221, USA©
L
pAbstract
I use the 2007 Schools and Staffing Survey to estimate the effect of tenure on K-12
teacher behavior. Estimates are obtained by exploiting the cross-state variation in the
probationary period length of novice teachers. I find that in the year that teachers
are evaluated for tenure, they spend significantly more of their own money on
classroom materials. The teachers also participate more in school committees and
extracurricular activities during the evaluation year. After increased activity during the
tenure evaluation year, behavior appears to return to the baseline established prior
to evaluation.
JEL Classifications: I21; I28; J22; M5
Keywords: Teacher tenure; Employment protection legislation1 Introduction
In most public school districts, teacher tenure is a time-honored element of teacher
employment contracts. However, several states across the United States have recently
introduced legislation to modify or eliminate teacher tenure. In 2011, the state of
Florida passed a bill that any new teacher hired would receive a year-to-year contract,
effectively eliminating tenure. In 2009, Ohio extended the probationary period before a
teacher is eligible for tenure from three years to seven years. Proponents of tenure
argue that once teachers demonstrate competency during a probationary time period,
they should be protected from arbitrary dismissal. Opponents of tenure argue that the
process of firing poor performing teachers is too time-consuming and expensive. Once
a teacher receives tenure, school districts must follow a detailed and costly sequence of
steps to fire a poor performing tenured teacher. As a consequence, few tenured
teachers are fired for poor performance in the United States. According to The Widget
Effect, from 2004–2008, Chicago Public Schools only formally dismissed 9 tenured
teachers, or 0.01 percent of its workforce. Prior to receiving tenure, school districts
can fire, or fail to renew the contract, of a probationary teacher for almost any
reason – with the exception of discriminatory or other illegal reasons. Because
tenure status increases a teacher’s job security by reducing the likelihood of being
fired, I investigate how teachers anticipate and respond to receiving tenure.
In this paper, I look at the change in a teacher’s spending on classroom materials
and explore whether teachers change their time allocation in activities outside of the
classroom (e.g., club sponsorship, coaching, serving on school committees, etc.).
Research has consistently found that teacher quality is one of the most important
school-level variables affecting student performance (Rivkin et al. 2005; Aaronson et al.2015 Jones; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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year may affect student performance. I also investigate how teacher work hours change
once a teacher is granted tenure – where the number of work hours is measured as the
total time a teacher spends on school-related activities during a given week. Relative to
the year that teachers are evaluated for tenure, I examine how these measures change
immediately before receiving tenure and in the years following tenure. To answer these
questions, I use data from the 2007–2008 restricted use version of the Schools and
Staffing Survey (SASS) and exploit the cross-state variation in the probationary period
length of novice teachers. The majority of states require that teachers serve for three years
in a district before tenure is granted. However, several states have shorter probationary
periods of only one or two years, while others have longer periods of four or five years.
Teacher tenure is a specific application of employment protection legislation (EPL)
which consists of the laws and regulations that govern the hiring and firing of workers.
Once a teacher is granted tenure, dismissal or firing costs increase considerably. There
is a sizable economics literature on the effects of EPL on various outcomes of interest.
Autor et al. (2007) found that the adoption of wrongful discharge protection laws in
the United States altered firms’ production choices, causing employers to retain
unproductive workers. Blanchard and Portugal (2001) found that the strict employment
protection in Portugal profoundly affected the labor market relative to the United States
and led to an increased duration of unemployment. Heckman and Pages (2000) showed
that job security legislation in Latin America reduced employment and increased wage
inequality across workers. Several other papers also found that EPL affects worker
employment (Lazear 1990; Miles 2000; Kugler and Saint Paul 2004; Martins 2009).
There are also papers that investigate the impact of EPL on individual worker behavior.
Ichino and Riphahn (2005) used data from a large Italian bank and found that employee
absenteeism increased significantly once employees were no longer under a probationary
period. Scoppa (2010) used the 1990 EPL reform act in Italy to investigate the effect on
worker absenteeism in that country. Using a difference-in-difference approach, the author
exploited the fact that the law drastically increased the firing costs for small firms and
found that shirking increased once employees were granted firing protection. Despite this
extensive literature, there is little research that looks at EPL in the context of K-12 educa-
tion. Jacob (2010) used the 2004 new collective bargaining agreement in Chicago Public
Schools (CPS) that gave principals the flexibility to dismiss probationary teachers for any
reason and found that annual teacher absences were reduced by roughly 10 percent.
Goldhaber and Hansen (2010) examine the implications of using value-added models as a
criterion for granting tenure to teachers. The Widget Effect, published by The New
Teacher Project, documents the relationship between tenure and the number of teachers
who are fired. While not specifically addressing teacher tenure, Hansen (2010) used North
Carolina administrative data and found that teacher absences increased dramatically in
the year prior to teacher retirement or departure. While understanding teacher behavior
under EPL is itself a worthwhile research question, this research is also an important first
step in understanding how teacher tenure might affect student outcomes to the extent
that teacher behavior changes under tenure.
I find that in the year that teachers are evaluated for tenure, they spend significantly
more of their own money on classroom materials. The teachers also participate more
in school committees and extracurricular activities during the evaluation year. I also
Jones IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:8 Page 3 of 19find evidence that these changes in behavior are temporary. After a spike in activity
during the tenure evaluation year, behavior appears to return to the baseline established
prior to being evaluated for tenure.2 State variation in teacher tenure
The history of teacher tenure in the United States began in 1909 when New Jersey
became the first state to pass comprehensive tenure legislation for K-12 teachers. By
the 1940s, seventy percent of teachers were covered by tenure protection; and today,
nearly every state has passed legislation granting some form of tenure. In some states,
tenure status is also called a continuing contract or permanent employment status.
Regardless of its name, tenure is a series of steps or due process that must be followed
in order to dismiss a tenured teacher. In order to receive tenure, new teachers in a
school district must be employed for a probationary period. During the 2007–2008
school year, the most common probationary period length was three years, but the
probationary period length varied between one year and five years. Table 1 shows the
probationary period for each state before a teacher was eligible to receive tenure.
The tenure process comprises at least the following four elements: time to tenure,
criteria to earn tenure, process for conferring tenure, and tenure protections (Hassel
et al. 2011). In this research, I exploit the variation in the time to tenure in order to
understand the effect of tenure on teacher behavior. The other tenure elements do not
vary substantially across the states. Incorporating student performance in the tenure
decision is rare at the state level. According to the 2008 NCTQ State Teacher Policy
Yearbook, only two states, Iowa and New Mexico, required that student academic
performance be considered in the criteria for awarding teacher tenure. Even in thoseTable 1 Number of years before a teacher earns tenure, by state, 2008
No policy (1) (3) 2 years (7) 3 years (33) 4 years (5) 5 years (2)
DC Hawaii California Alabama New Jersey Connecticut Indiana
Mississippi Maine Alaska New Mexico Illinois Missouri
N. Dakota Maryland Arizona New York Kentucky
Nevada Arkansas Ohio Michigan













Source: NCTQ state teacher policy yearbook 2008.
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Because states often leave tenure decisions to the discretion of the local school district,
I also investigate to what extent student performance, specifically student growth, is
discussed in school district contracts as a requirement for teacher tenure. Out of the 50
largest school districts in the United States, only three districts specifically require
teachers to demonstrate objective student growth on standardized tests prior to being
awarded tenure during the 2007–2008 school year, according to the NCTQ Teacher
Contract Database.
Because of the increased intensity of performance reviews and in-class evaluations
during the tenure evaluation year, as well as the saliency of the process, we might
expect an increase or “spike” in teacher effort and activities during that year. Primary
and secondary tenure operates differently than university tenure. For example, Singell
and Lillydahl (1996) find that assistant professors spend more time on teaching and
research compared to full professors, but there is no difference in time allocation
within the rank of assistant professor. Link et al. (2008) find similar results. Earning
tenure in a university environment requires consistent and persistent efforts over a five
to seven year period of time.
While the systems for conferring tenure across states are procedurally different, the
outcomes are not – few teachers who are eligible for tenure are denied this status. In
the 2009 report, The Widget Effect, researchers find that in five of the six school
districts they studied, less than one percent of probationary teachers were denied
tenure. Since the time of the report, several states and districts have increased the
standards required to receive tenure. For example, in the 2010–2011 school year,
New York City introduced more stringent requirements in order for teachers to
achieve tenure. Teachers are now rated under a four-point scale that must incorporate
student test scores, classroom observations, and parental feedback (the previous rating
system only measured two levels – unsatisfactory and satisfactory). The number of
teachers who were denied tenure outright increased from 1 percent in 2006 (approxi-
mately the same time period of the data used in this research) to 3 percent in 2011.
In contrast, teachers outside of New York City but still in the state of New York are
not always subject to these rigorous elements for tenure. New York state law only
requires that teachers be granted tenure after a majority vote of the Board of Coopera-
tive Educational Services upon the recommendation of the district superintendent. The
district superintendent must write a report to the board of cooperative educational
services indicating that the teacher is “competent, efficient and satisfactory.” There is
no rubric or requirement that teachers meet student achievement benchmarks or
undergo a certain number of observations from a principal or third-party observer. In
reviewing tenure documents across the remaining states, I conclude that while the
procedural nature of the tenure application varies, there is little substantive difference
in the outcomes of the tenure process.
Finally, once a teacher receives tenure, every state provides a substantially higher
degree of protection for a teacher’s employment contract. According to data from the
2007–2008 SASS, only two percent of teachers in the United States were dismissed or
failed to have their contract renewed. Table 2 shows the wide variation in dismissal
rates across states. South Dakota removed almost 12 percent of its teachers for poor
performance, while Arkansas removed only 0.2 percent. In some school districts, that





Number of teachers who
were dismissed or did not
have their contracts renewed
Percentage of teachers who
were dismissed or did not
have their contracts renewed
United States 211.4 4.4 2.1%
Highest 5 States
South Dakota 59.8 7.1 11.9%
Alaska 166.1 9.6 5.8%
Minnesota 128.8 4.8 3.7%
Alabama 384.7 14.1 3.7%
Oklahoma 75.7 2.7 3.6%
Lowest 5 States
Nevada 1,527.4 8.6 0.6%
Delaware 227.5 1.2 0.5%
Pennsylvania 180.9 0.9 0.5%
North Dakota 46.2 0.2 0.4%
Arkansas 123.0 0.3 0.2%
Note: Of the ~3,780 districts, only 18% of districts fired a tenured teacher for poor performance.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS),
“Public School District Data File,” 2007–08.
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generated heterogeneity in teacher response. However, I could find no significant differ-
ence between states which fire a relatively higher percentage of teachers relative to
those which fire a relatively lower percentage of teachers. This lack of heterogeneity
could be due to the fact that outside of South Dakota and Alaska, every state fired less
than four percent of teachers for poor performance.3 Data
Details on state tenure laws come from the 2008 National Council on Teacher Quality
(NCTQ) State Teacher Policy Yearbook. In the yearbook, NCTQ publishes each
state’s probationary period before a teacher may be granted tenure, as well as a
citation for the relevant state law. In addition, prior to publication of the yearbook, the
organization provides state officials with a draft copy of its findings in order to check
the accuracy of its claims. Because some laws were written to permit school district
administrators to have authority over teacher tenure under special circumstances, at
times, discretion must be used to code a state’s probationary period into a numerical
value. For example, the state of Maryland has a probationary period of two years, but
it may be extended to three years on an individual basis. NCTQ decided to code
Maryland as having a two-year probationary period. In the four states where NCTQ notes
that there are potentially different interpretations, I follow NCTQ’s coding scheme.
I match the 2007 NCTQ data to teacher response data from the restricted-use ver-
sion of the 2007–2008 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), conducted by the National
Center for Education Statistics. Begun in 1987, the SASS is fielded every three to four
years and surveys a stratified random sample of public schools, private schools, and
schools funded by the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE). The SASS collects data on
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general conditions in schools. In addition to restricting the sample to public school
teachers only, teachers who indicated that they received no salary or did not work full
time were dropped from the analysis. Teachers from career or vocational schools,
alternative schools, and special education schools were also removed from the sample.
These teachers were dropped because of the unique circumstances of these schools.
Because I am only interested in looking at teacher behavior around tenure, I remove
teachers who have been teaching for 8 or more years. Table 3 provides summary statis-
tics for the 2007 SASS sample.
Table 3 describes overall characteristics of the teaching labor force in the 2007–2008
SASS. Teaching is a female-dominated profession with more than three-quarters of all
teachers being female. Over one-half of teachers work in a district with a collective-
bargaining agreement. Teachers are asked to provide the total amount of hours spent
on all teaching and school-related activities during a typical full week, and the average
for this variable is 53 hours per week. This self-reported number of work hours is
higher than what is found in other well-known datasets like the CPS; however, theTable 3 Summary statistics, data from 2007 SASS
Teacher demographics Mean Min Max Std. Dev.
Age 37.88 20 76 0.16
White 0.90 0 1 0.01
Male 0.23 0 1 0.01
Teaching Year 3.34 1 7 0.03
Salary $42,175 $15,000 $110,000 $10,945
School Characteristics
Student-Teacher Ratio 14.61 1 83.3 0.09
Free Lunch Percentage 0.43 0 1 0.01
District Characteristics
Expenditures per Student $11,878 $4,899 $69,203 $115
Collective Bargaining Agreement 0.53 0 1 0.01
Outcomes of Interest
Work Hours 53.30 30 80 8.71
Own Money Spent $422.86 0 $9000 $8.44
Professional Development 0.88 0 1 0.01
Communication1 0.84 0 1 0.01
Job Security Worry2 0.34 0 1 0.01
Coach a School Sport 0.18 0 1 0.01
Serve as a Curriculum Specialist 0.09 0 1 0.01
Serve on a School or District Committee 0.51 0 1 0.01
Sponsor a School Club 0.37 0 1 0.01
Total Observations 15,650
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes.
1) Dummy variable is defined as 1 if a teacher uses any of the following to communicate with parents or students
outside of the regular school day: e-mail to send out group updates, e-mail to address individual questions or concerns,
online bulletin board, course or teacher web page, course or teacher blog, instant messaging (IM).
2) Teachers are asked if they agree or strongly agree with the following statement “I worry about the security of my job
because of the performance of my students on state and/or local tests.
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after school, and on the weekends.
Teachers indicate that they spend about $420 of their own money on average on
classroom supplies. The fact that teachers spend their own money in the classroom is
so common that the IRS allows a tax deduction for these purchases called the Educator
Expense Deduction. Teachers can deduct up to $250 of any unreimbursed expenses
incurred for books, supplies, computer equipment, and other supplementary materials.
In addition, I look at teacher participation in school extra-curricular activities as a
measure of teacher devotion. Approximately eighteen percent of teachers coach a sport
at the school they teach, and one-third of teachers sponsor a school club. Over one-
half of teachers indicate that they serve on a school or district wide committee, while
only ten percent serve as a curriculum specialist. Almost ninety percent of teachers
participate in some form of professional development.
In order for tenure to alter behavior, teachers must have flexibility to make changes
around school and extracurricular activities. In the SASS, teachers are asked, “How
many hours are you required to work to receive base pay during a typical full week at
this school?” On average, school districts require teachers to work 38 hours a week.
Since teachers indicate that they spend 53 hours on all teaching-related activities, there
is still considerable flexibility for teachers to reduce participation rates in extracurricular
activities. Likewise, if teachers are required to participate in professional development
activities, teacher tenure could not affect any changes in professional development partici-
pation rates. While states do require teachers to participate in some form of professional
development to maintain their certification, there is often a time window in which to
complete these activities. For example, the state of Ohio requires a teacher to complete 18
continuing education units over a 5 year time period in order to maintain certification.
Because a teacher has flexibility around scheduling these units, the possibility of strategic
behavior in response to teacher tenure exists.
Previous literature has found a relationship between teacher behavior, attitudes, in-
structional practices, and other activities on student achievement. Palardy and Rumberger
(2008) found positive effects on student achievement by teachers who use different
curricula and approaches to instructional practices (e.g., journal writing, silent reading,
geometric manipulations, etc.). Other literature has found similar effects of instructional
practices on student achievement (Lee et al. 1997; Xue and Meisels 2004; Guarino and
Hamilton 2006). In the SASS, teachers who serve as curriculum specialists may be willing
to improve their curriculum and approach to teaching. Teachers’ use of their own money
also signals a desire to invest more in curriculum or instructional practices in order to posi-
tively affect student achievement. In addition, a teacher’s attitude at work has been shown
to influence student achievement (Rowan et al. 1991). Finally, a teacher’s credentialing, as
evidenced by investing in professional development, has been found to produce mixed
results on student achievement. Some authors have found a positive effect, while others
have found little or no effect (Goldhaber and Brewer 2001; Wayne and Youngs 2003).4 Empirical methodology
To estimate the effects of teacher tenure on effort, I use a type of difference-in-difference
framework to exploit the cross-state variation in the time required for a teacher to earn
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period specified in the employment contract. Within the 50 states, I use the observations
in the first year after a teacher receives tenure as the treatment group in the model. The
control group consists of teachers who are in the same year of teaching as the treatment
group but have not yet received tenure because of the state’s longer probationary period.
I use this estimation method because simply comparing the differences in outcomes
before and after tenure may be confounded by other factors that drive these differences.
For example, teachers with one more year of experience may not need as much time to
teach the material effectively. There could also be changes in expectations around school
service activities for more experienced teachers. For these and other reasons, using states
with a longer probationary period controls for the differences in teacher behavior that are
not related to teacher tenure.
Figure 1 provides a visual description of the identification strategy by plotting the
amount of unreimbursed money that teachers spend on classroom materials by the
length of a state’s probationary period. For the states with either a two or three year
probationary period, Figure 1 clearly shows a “spike” in classroom expenditures in the
year that a teacher is being evaluated for tenure. Teachers in two year probationary
period states spend more than $100 of their own money in that year relative to the
previous year or following year. This sharp increase in expenditures in the year of
tenure evaluation motivates the following empirical specification.
For the empirical analysis, I estimate the following equation:
Y icdst ¼ β0 þ BeforeTenureEvalicdstβ1 þ 1YrTenureicdstβ2 þ 2PlusYrTenureicdstβ3
þIicdstβ4 þ Ccdstβ5 þ Ddstβ6 þ μs þ υicdst þ εicdst;
ð1Þ
where Yicdst is the outcome of interest for teacher i, in school c, in school district d, in
state s, in teaching year t. BeforeTenureEval is a dummy variable indicating if theFigure 1 Personal money spent on classroom materials, SASS data.
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indicating if a teacher is in the first year of teaching with tenure, and 2PlusYrsTenure is
a dummy variable indicating if a teacher has two or more years of teaching with tenure.
Finally, I is a vector of individual characteristics, S is a vector of school-level character-
istics, and D is a vector of district-level characteristics, μs are state dummy variables,
υicdst are dummy variables for years of teaching experience, and εicdst is an idiosyncratic
error term. Coefficients on the three tenure dummy variables are interpreted relative to
the tenure evaluation year.
One potential concern is how to address the tenure status of veteran teachers who
transfer school districts. There are a few examples where states have made it easier for
veteran teachers to acquire tenure after transferring school districts. For example, in
2011, Illinois passed SB7, which allows previously tenured teachers who earned either a
“Proficient” or “Excellent” rating to be eligible for tenure in 2 years if they earned an
“Excellent” rating in each of the first two years in the new district. A new teacher in
Illinois would be on probation for four years, rather than two. With the limitations of
the data, I cannot calculate whether or not this type of condition would be applicable
for a teacher in the dataset. Therefore, I treat all teachers as under the same tenure
laws as specified in the NCTQ dataset. Including potentially tenured teachers in my
estimation strategy would bias my results towards zero. One other concern is that
teacher behavior after tenure may be partly driven by selection effects. If less efficient
teachers are less likely to receive tenure, then the results may be biased. While there is
some concern about selection effects, in 48 out of 50 states, less than four percent of
teachers are fired for poor performance. To the extent that selection bias may exist, the
effect is likely to be small.5 Results
The estimate of the effect of teacher tenure on classroom expenditures is reported in
column 1 of Table 4.
Relative to the tenure evaluation year, teachers spend approximately $70 less on
classroom materials in the years leading up to the evaluation. Likewise, they also spend
approximately $75 less in the first year of receiving tenure. This amount reflects an 18
percent decline from the average of $420 spent on classroom materials. The coefficient
of $68 on the Tenure Evaluation Year dummy in Column 2 of Table 4 clearly shows
the spike in expenditures in the tenure evaluation year. Column 3 of Table 4 shows the
results using a simplified difference-in-difference specification with only using dummy
variables for the first year of tenure as well as for two or more years with tenure.
Relative to teachers without tenure, teachers in the first year of tenure spend $73 less
on classroom expenditures. However, even though the coefficient on the “Two or More
Years with Tenure” dummy is negative, it is statistically insignificant, suggesting that
the immediate drop in classroom expenditures may be temporary. Teachers may feel
that they need to “take a break” after the tenure evaluation year, but behavior reverts
back to trend after a one year pause. Column 4 of Table 4, which presents the baseline
specification without any teacher or district controls, shows that the decline in
classroom expenditures is not driven by changes in teacher or district characteristics.
Regardless of whether teachers spend their own money as an investment in their
Table 4 Effect of teaching tenure on own money spent, SASS data








Before Tenure Evaluation −68.068** −69.038**
(29.924) (29.881)
Tenure Evaluation Year 68.068**
(29.924)
First Year With Tenure −75.567** −7.499 −72.582* −62.519**
(34.803) (45.906) (36.886) (27.533)
Two Or More Years
With Tenure
−26.897 41.171 −38.842 −20.752
(44.233) (62.679) (44.507) (41.629)
Black −84.454*** −84.454*** −85.612***
(20.784) (20.784) (20.908)
Hispanic 30.993 30.993 31.075
(23.033) (23.033) (22.555)
Other Race −91.581** −91.581** −91.120**
(34.666) (34.666) (34.728)
Male −96.151*** −96.151*** −95.840***
(13.985) (13.985) (13.926)
Age 2.561*** 2.561*** 2.560***
(0.917) (0.917) (0.918)
Salary ($1000s) 2.690*** 2.690*** 2.689***
(0.966) (0.966) (0.969)
Student-Teacher Ratio −3.127* −3.127* −3.111*
(1.681) (1.681) (1.677)
Free Lunch Percentage 84.657*** 84.657*** 85.726***
(24.353) (24.353) (24.352)
Expenditures Per Student −2.613** −2.613** −2.729**
(1.196) (1.196) (1.184)
Collective Bargaining 18.375 18.375 17.558
(19.784) (19.784) (19.970)
Second Year of Teaching 64.957*** 64.957*** 66.058*** 65.920***
(18.742) (18.742) (18.627) (19.310)
Third Year of Teaching 24.848 24.848 36.029 32.846
(28.267) (28.267) (25.755) (27.988)
Fourth Year of Teaching −31.896 −31.896 25.074 −18.136
(34.405) (34.405) (20.975) (34.777)
Fifth Year of Teaching −37.237 −37.237 27.344 −28.892
(52.303) (52.303) (39.033) (49.917)
Sixth Year of Teaching −67.960 −67.960 9.762 −45.762
(64.568) (64.568) (42.686) (66.013)
Seventh Year of Teaching −74.371 −74.371 4.934 −53.010
(76.580) (76.580) (53.745) (74.962)
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Table 4 Effect of teaching tenure on own money spent, SASS data (Continued)
R-squared 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.034
Observations 15,120 15,120 15,120 15,650
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
State effects and teaching year effects are included in the above regressions.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes.
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perceive the return on their money to decline immediately after tenure.
Table 5 shows the effect of tenure on extra-curricular activities outside of the class-
room. Column 1 shows that teachers are six percentage points less likely to serve on a
school or district-wide committee immediately after receiving tenure. Columns 2 and 3
of Table 5 show a participation rate spike in coaching a sport and serving as a curricu-
lum specialist during the tenure evaluation year. Teachers who temporarily coach a
sport (or serve as an assistant coach) for one year may not be ideal for student develop-
ment. In contrast to these declines, once teachers receive tenure, they are five percent-
age points more likely to sponsor a student organization, group, or club in the year
following tenure. Teachers who would like to sponsor a club may feel that their time is
better spent on more visible and/or more rewarded activities during the tenure evalu-
ation year. Tenure may allow these teachers to pursue other student development
activities. This reallocation of time between different extra-curricular activities may
explain why tenure does not change the overall level of teacher work hours. Consistent
with the findings on classroom expenditures, the participation rates in extracurricular
activities appears to be a temporary phenomenon, or “spike”, associated with the tenure
evaluation year. All of these results still hold under a probit model.
Table 6 shows the effect of teacher tenure on other measures of teacher behavior.
Teachers are asked if they communicate with students or parents outside of the class-
room using any of the following: email, online bulletin board, course or teacher web
page, blog, or instant messaging. In column 1 of Table 6, I find no evidence that
teachers change the intensity of their communication with students and parents. In
column 2 of Table 6, I find that teachers are 6 percentage points less likely to partici-
pate in professional development two or more years after receiving tenure. This is the
only behavioral outcome which appears to change permanently. If professional develop-
ment is only partially subsidized or not at all by the school district, teachers may not
feel the need to pursue professional development for maintaining employment at the
school district. In column 3 of Table 6, I find that overall teacher work hours do not
change. If this measure were defined only as teacher work hours at the school, then
there would obviously be no change in teacher work hours. However, the SASS defines
teacher work hours more broadly as all school-related activities that take place during
the week – including the weekends. Under this definition, there is potential for teacher
work hour changes. Since I do not find an increase or decrease in teacher work hours
during the tenure evaluation year, I conclude that the spike in certain activities during
this year must reduce the amount of time spent on other school-related activities. In
Column 4 of Table 6, I find that tenured teachers feel they have more job security
relative to the tenure evaluation year. Immediately after receiving tenure, teachers are
four percentage points less likely to agree or strongly agree with the statement, “I worry
Table 5 Estimates of teacher tenure on extracurricular activities, SASS data
Dependent variable (1) Committee (2) Curriculum (3) Coach (4) Sponsor
Before Tenure Evaluation −0.002 −0.038*** −0.033** −0.021
(0.024) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023)
First Year With Tenure −0.055* −0.026* −0.025* 0.053*
(0.031) (0.014) (0.015) (0.028)
Two Or More Years With Tenure −0.061 −0.011 −0.001 0.041
(0.044) (0.016) (0.022) (0.034)
Black −0.040 −0.013 0.025 0.093***
(0.029) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024)
Hispanic −0.143*** −0.011 −0.009 −0.067***
(0.040) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017)
Other Race −0.140*** 0.055*** −0.033 0.011
(0.038) (0.019) (0.024) (0.030)
Male −0.091*** 0.000 0.343*** 0.125***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016)
Age −0.001* 0.001*** −0.006*** −0.002**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Salary ($1000s) 0.002** 0.001*** −0.000 −0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Student-Teacher Ratio −0.010*** −0.002* 0.002* 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Free Lunch Percentage −0.058** −0.008 −0.045** −0.096***
(0.026) (0.013) (0.022) (0.027)
Expenditures Per Student −0.003** 0.003** 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Collective Bargaining −0.001 0.006 −0.029** −0.019
(0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Second Year of Teaching 0.106*** 0.008 0.007 0.048***
(0.017) (0.010) (0.020) (0.015)
Third Year of Teaching 0.135*** 0.003 0.008 0.086***
(0.019) (0.011) (0.014) (0.022)
Fourth Year of Teaching 0.184*** 0.032* 0.009 0.083***
(0.036) (0.017) (0.021) (0.031)
Fifth Year of Teaching 0.207*** 0.031 −0.010 0.001
(0.048) (0.020) (0.027) (0.042)
Sixth Year of Teaching 0.216*** 0.012 −0.005 0.006
(0.057) (0.024) (0.024) (0.048)
Seventh Year of Teaching 0.235*** 0.044* 0.005 0.050
(0.053) (0.026) (0.022) (0.037)
R-squared 0.057 0.034 0.184 0.043
Observations 15,120 15,120 15,120 15,120
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
State effects and teaching year effects are included in the above regressions.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Note 1: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes.
Note 2: Omitted tenure category variable is “evaluation year”.
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Table 6 Estimates of teacher tenure on other behaviors, SASS data
Dependent variable (1) communication (2) Professional
development
(3) Work hours (4) Job security
worry
Before Tenure Evaluation −0.023 −0.006 0.500 0.026
(0.019) (0.014) (0.545) (0.028)
First Year With Tenure −0.019 −0.012 0.522 −0.040**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.421) (0.018)
Two Or More Years With Tenure −0.012 −0.058** 0.057 −0.056**
(0.030) (0.025) (0.874) (0.023)
Black −0.055* 0.031 −0.094 −0.008
(0.030) (0.021) (0.466) (0.040)
Hispanic −0.023 −0.015 0.378 0.067***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.278) (0.020)
Other Race −0.041* 0.040** −0.300 0.011
(0.023) (0.020) (0.484) (0.041)
Male 0.019 −0.067*** 0.800* −0.015
(0.011) (0.014) (0.450) (0.014)
Age −0.002*** 0.001** 0.012 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.001)
Salary ($1000s) 0.000 0.001* −0.035* −0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.020) (0.001)
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.004** −0.002 0.027 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.034) (0.001)
Free Lunch Percentage −0.387*** 0.016 −2.190*** 0.247***
(0.061) (0.015) (0.455) (0.033)
Expenditures Per Student −0.004* 0.000 0.050* 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.025) (0.001)
Collective Bargaining −0.020 0.007 −0.042 −0.005
(0.019) (0.016) (0.349) (0.019)
Second Year of Teaching −0.002 0.025* −0.380 −0.001
(0.015) (0.013) (0.528) (0.034)
Third Year of Teaching 0.019 0.041*** −0.187 −0.037
(0.016) (0.012) (0.710) (0.034)
Fourth Year of Teaching 0.037 0.028 −0.844 −0.005
(0.025) (0.024) (0.791) (0.040)
Fifth Year of Teaching 0.026 0.071*** −1.593* −0.001
(0.031) (0.021) (0.932) (0.042)
Sixth Year of Teaching 0.018 0.076*** −1.471 0.000
(0.038) (0.028) (1.046) (0.043)
Seventh Year of Teaching 0.000 0.068** −0.977 0.030
(0.039) (0.029) (1.534) (0.051)
R-squared 0.143 0.028 0.032 0.044
Observations 15,120 15,120 15,120 15,120
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
State effects and teaching year effects are included in the above regressions.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Note 1: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes.
Note 2: Omitted tenure category variable is “evaluation year”.
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Jones IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:8 Page 14 of 19about the security of my job because of the performance of my students on state
and/or local tests.” With two or more years of tenure, teachers are six percentage
points less likely to agree with this statement relative to teachers in their tenure evalu-
ation year. This result is evidence that the tenure definitions in equation 1 are consist-
ent with the notion that tenure is effective in reducing concerns about job security.
Finally, Table 7 presents evidence that men and women may respond differently in
the year of tenure evaluation. While column 1 shows that the difference in the amount
of money spent in the classroom does not vary meaningfully, women are more likely to
participate in school committees during the tenure evaluation year. They are also more
likely to coach a school sport relative to the year before and the year after tenure evalu-
ation. In contrast, men appear much less likely to sponsor a school club during their
tenure evaluation year.6 Threats to identification
The validity of the estimation strategy relies on the assumption that teachers in their
tenure evaluation year are similar to teachers with the same years of experience but
teach in a district with a longer probationary period. For example, third year teachers
in districts that award tenure in the third year of teaching are similar to third year
teachers in districts that award tenure in the fourth of fifth year of teaching. SaidTable 7 Estimates of teacher tenure, by gender
Dependent variable (1) Own money spent (2) Committee (3) Coach (4) Sponsor
Male
Before Tenure Evaluation −71.598 0.038 −0.003 0.133**
(47.735) (0.055) (0.035) (0.050)
First Year With Tenure −99.419* 0.035 0.029 0.120*
(51.879) (0.059) (0.049) (0.070)
Two Or More Years With Tenure −53.149 −0.008 −0.003 0.136**
(69.534) (0.054) (0.055) (0.051)
All Other Control Variables
R-squared 0.041 0.064 0.102 0.050
Observations 4540 4540 4540 4540
Female
Before Tenure Evaluation −65.714* −0.010 −0.038** −0.066**
(33.060) (0.037) (0.018) (0.030)
First Year With Tenure −69.426 −0.082** −0.040** 0.030
(46.556) (0.033) (0.017) (0.032)
Two Or More Years With Tenure −19.227 −0.076 0.001 0.012
(53.599) (0.056) (0.031) (0.042)
All Other Control Variables
R-squared 0.054 0.057 0.047 0.036
Observations 10,570 10,570 10,570 10,570
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
State effects and teaching year effects are included in the above regressions.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Note 1: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes.
Note 2: Omitted tenure category variable is “evaluation year”.
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teristics unrelated to tenure that modify teacher behavior during this evaluation period.
The previous finding in column 4 of Table 4, which presents the baseline specifica-
tion without any teacher or district controls, showed that the decline in classroom
expenditures is not driven by changes in teacher or district characteristics. This finding
suggests that there is not cross-sectional variation in teacher and district characteristics
at the time of tenure evaluation. Including these characteristics in the estimating
equation is done to improve efficiency and not to control for confounding factors. If
the key findings only exist once these covariates are included, one might speculate that
there are additional factors, outside of tenure, driving the results.
I will next present two tests to provide evidence that the cross-sectional variation in
the treatment and control groups would not have changed in an environment without
tenure. First, if the identification strategy for teacher tenure is working properly, I
would not expect to see any changes in teacher behavior after the transition period
from probation to tenure. Columns 1–4 in Table 8 show that there is no statistically
significant difference in teacher extra-curricular activities (the same variables as in
Table 5) between the second and third years after receiving tenure. Note that the
difference-in-difference strategy may still causally identify the effect of teacher tenure
even if there is a change in behavior moving from year 2 to year 3 in a three year
probationary period district. For example, particularly forward-looking teachers may
start to increase their teaching hours in advance of the tenure application process.
In the second test for the validity of the empirical methodology, I carry out a placebo
test where I investigate if outcomes, which should be unaffected by tenure, change as a
result of the identification strategy. Teachers are asked if any of the following are ser-
ious or moderate problems: student tardiness, students being unprepared, or students
dropping out. We would not expect the coefficients of these variables in the estimating
equation to be statistically different from zero as a result of tenure evaluation. Column
1–3 of Table 9 provide confirmation of this intuition. The coefficients on the
dummies for Period Before Tenure Evaluation, First Year with Tenure, and Two or More
Years with Tenure are all statistically insignificant. In addition to student behavior not
changing as a result of tenure, column 4 of Table 9 shows that a teacher’s base salary
does not change either. In almost every school district, teacher salary is a function of
experience and education. With no statistically significant coefficients on the tenure year
variables, column 4 provides more evidence for the validity of the identification strategy.7 Conclusion
This paper describes the change in teacher behavior during the tenure evaluation year.
I find that in the year that teachers are evaluated for tenure, they spend significantly
more of their own money on classroom materials. The teachers also participate more
in school committees and extracurricular activities during the evaluation year. This
paper does not make the larger and more ambitious claims about the welfare implica-
tions of this behavior. While certain activities are unlikely to benefit from a spike in
activity around the tenure evaluation year (e.g., coaching a sport likely requires several
years to master), tenure may also grant teachers the freedom to pursue club sponsor-
ship and other activities that may not have been pursued under an annual evaluation.
Table 8 Falsification test, change in dependent variable between 2 and 3 years after
tenure, SASS data
Dependent variable (1) Committee (2) Curriculum (3) Coach (4) Sponsor
Three Years After Tenure −0.016 0.006 −0.004 −0.010
(0.025) (0.011) (0.021) (0.023)
Black −0.091 −0.021 0.033 0.135***
(0.057) (0.040) (0.038) (0.049)
Hispanic −0.195** 0.008 −0.025 −0.051
(0.079) (0.033) (0.036) (0.051)
Other Race 0.003 0.100 −0.103** 0.051*
(0.104) (0.066) (0.047) (0.029)
Male −0.103*** 0.023 0.364*** 0.153***
(0.022) (0.033) (0.028) (0.042)
Age −0.000 0.002 −0.007*** −0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salary ($1000s) −0.000 0.003*** 0.000 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Student-Teacher Ratio −0.005 −0.005 0.001 0.008*
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Free Lunch Percentage 0.006 −0.048* −0.111*** −0.112***
(0.058) (0.027) (0.039) (0.039)
Expenditures Per Student −0.009 −0.000 −0.002 0.001
(0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Collective Bargaining −0.126*** −0.019 −0.008 −0.017
(0.037) (0.022) (0.031) (0.052)
Second Year of Teaching −0.125*** −0.019 −0.008 −0.017
(0.037) (0.022) (0.031) (0.052)
Third Year of Teaching 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fourth Year of Teaching 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fifth Year of Teaching −0.034 −0.002 −0.039 0.000
(0.054) (0.012) (0.032) (0.032)
Sixth Year of Teaching −0.078 −0.027 −0.021 −0.073
(0.051) (0.022) (0.044) (0.049)
Seventh Year of Teaching −0.057 −0.056*** 0.001 −0.041
(0.041) (0.018) (0.056) (0.047)
R-squared 0.084 0.062 0.234 0.065
Observations 2980 2980 2980 2980
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
State effects and teaching year effects are included in the above regressions.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Note 1: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes.
Note 2: Omitted tenure category variable is “evaluation year”.
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that they need to “take a break” after the tenure evaluation year, but then their behavior
returns to the status quo after a one year pause. This finding should concern district
Table 9 Falsification test, effect of teacher tenure on placebo variables, SASS data








Before Tenure Evaluation 0.016 0.014 0.021 0.461
(0.023) (0.016) (0.028) (0.651)
First Year With Tenure −0.022 0.006 0.007 −0.037
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.357)
Two Or More Years With Tenure −0.021 0.010 −0.024 0.200
(0.027) (0.023) (0.025) (0.633)
Black 0.032* 0.009 −0.045** 1.341***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.021) (0.378)
Hispanic 0.004 −0.014 −0.066*** 1.231*
(0.014) (0.012) (0.020) (0.688)
Other Race 0.052** 0.039 −0.079*** 3.167**
(0.026) (0.032) (0.025) (1.295)
Male −0.041*** −0.033*** −0.196*** −0.024
(0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.341)
Age 0.001* −0.001 −0.002*** 0.415***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028)
Salary ($1000s) −0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Student-Teacher Ratio −0.005** −0.005** −0.018*** 0.192***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.046)
Free Lunch Percentage −0.202*** −0.277*** −0.028 −2.078***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.044) (0.618)
Expenditures Per Student 0.001 0.002 −0.004* 0.315**
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.155)
Collective Bargaining −0.002 −0.002 −0.006 0.574
(0.023) (0.018) (0.027) (0.557)
Second Year of Teaching −0.038** −0.044*** 0.011 0.652
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.448)
Third Year of Teaching −0.024 −0.043** −0.001 0.390
(0.029) (0.020) (0.030) (0.774)
Fourth Year of Teaching −0.042 −0.046** 0.046 1.460
(0.038) (0.023) (0.029) (1.021)
Fifth Year of Teaching −0.050 −0.033 0.067* 2.323**
(0.037) (0.023) (0.033) (0.955)
Sixth Year of Teaching −0.053 −0.028 0.071 3.045***
(0.040) (0.026) (0.044) (0.980)
Seventh Year of Teaching −0.026 −0.032 0.064 3.931***
(0.038) (0.029) (0.044) (1.139)
R-squared 0.045 0.080 0.065 0.453
Observations 15,120 15,120 15,120 15,120
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
State effects and teaching year effects are included in the above regressions.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Note 1: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes.
Note 2: For columns 1 – 3, teachers are asked if those issues are serious or moderate problems.
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Jones IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:8 Page 18 of 19policymakers since it suggests that tenure is temporarily altering teacher behavior.
District officials would hope that their policies have a permanent effect on teaching
behavior; however, the only finding that appears to be permanent is a decrease in time
spent on professional development after receiving tenure. In contrast, those states
which have eliminated tenure should not see swings in teacher behavior around tenure
evaluation. This consequence may make planning and staffing decisions easier for
school district officials in these states.
The findings in this paper lead to interesting avenues of future research. If teachers
behave strategically, the next step should be to investigate the impact of tenure on
student achievement. The primary limitation to this study is that it does not establish
the link between teacher behavior and student achievement. For example, does student
achievement noticeably improve in the year that a teacher is being evaluated for
tenure? If teachers are spending more of their own money on classroom materials and
spending more time communicating with students and parents, then students’
academic performance may improve. Consequently, does student performance decline
in the year immediately following tenure? Since total work hours remain unchanged
after tenure, a teacher’s reallocation of time towards certain extracurricular activities
may provide insight into the link between teacher activities and student achievement.
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